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Abstract: 
The principles of “certainty” and “autonomy” are central to the Torrens system 
and contract law respectively. Courts seek to resolve conflict between these 
principles. Systemic incoherence is especially apparent when courts consider 
the all-obligations mortgage.  
The mortgage document does not only place a charge on title. It secures 
personal obligations also. Registration may or may not extend to these 
obligations. According to the laws of contract, these personal obligations are 
established by the substance of the relationship between the parties, illustrated 
by a structure of legal forms via the contract. Registration then purports to 
"animate” the contract through the legal form of "title/interest by registration”. 
Hence the title of this paper: the "Frankenstein Mortgage". 
The Torrens system requires jurisdictions to engage in a perpetual search for 
coherence. An awareness of the ideological disunion underlying the law of real 
property enables judges to subduct concepts in a congruent manner and achieve 
a semblance of a unified legal form.  
Rather than etiolating the Torrens principle of certainty through policy-based 
rationales, reforms require an examination of residuary common law principles 
and conceptual sources of law, combined with a consciousness of the illogical 
nature of lawmaking that must, to maximize practical efficacy, provide a 
compromise between the two systems. 
 
Key words: Torrens, mortgage, immediate indefeasibility, deferred indefeasibility, 
jurisprudence. 
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I Introduction: 
The human desire for property is rivalrous. The utility of possession of 
material goods, including real property, is therefore maximised where 
the law enables stability of ownership:1  
There are different species of goods, which we are possess’d of: the 
internal satisfaction of our minds, the external advantages of our body, 
and the enjoyment of such possessions as we have acquir’d by our 
industry and good fortune…as the improvement, therefore, of these 
goods is the chief advantage of society, so the instability of their 
possession, along with their scarcity, is the chief impediment.  
The Torrens system conceptualises stability of ownership as "dynamic 
security": security of transaction, where the law upholds bona fide 
transferees' expectations of acquiring good title, unburdened by claims 
which they did not agree to.2 The principle of "static security" prevents 
transfer of property other than by accordance with the law of contract – 
consensual transfer, whereby the transferee's set of rights devolves from 
the transferor’s through the meeting of the minds.  Current New Zealand 
personal property law and the pre-Torrens English deed system 
prioritise static security over dynamic security. Systems of immediate 
indefeasibility, such as the current New Zealand Torrens system, favour 
dynamic security over static security.  
Immediate indefeasibility relies on a core statutory provision within the 
Torrens code which holds that the registered proprietor's title is 
paramount. Purposively, the approach views the core provision as a 
manifestation of the intentions behind the Torrens system: to provide 
certainty and a radical shift from the vexed rules of unregistered 
conveyancing.  
Deferred indefeasibility does not construe the Torrens statute in terms 
of core and subsidiary provisions. The putative "core provision" is only 
                                                          
1 Hume (1739), A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2000) at [3.2.2].  
2 R Demogue "Security" in A Fouille (ed) Modern French Legal Philosophy 
(Hardpress, Lenox, 2013) at 428. 
 
 
4 
 
a "general statement to be read subject to other provisions".3Arguably, 
the deferred indefeasibility approach is purposive and principled on a 
more complex and engaged level. Registration should only be cancelled 
in order to protect those who deal on good faith and for value – in a 
manner which the register authorises. Thus, the register is a source of 
"authority" for title in a purposive manner, as titles which are registered 
and which are of themselves in accordance with the rules of the 
registration system are protected. According to immediate 
indefeasibility, the mere fact of registration creates title. 
From a policy perspective, commentators have observed that neither 
deferred nor immediate indefeasibility fully gives effect to Torrens 
principles. One viewpoint shows that immediate indefeasibility gives 
purchasers better security when entering into the transaction, but it 
permits an ongoing risk of owners losing their land through forgery.4 
Another argues that deferred indefeasibility imposes a burden of inquiry 
on all purchasers, and decreases ease of conveyancing as it threatens 
registered titles; title can be challenged at any time on the bases of 
defects in the transaction.5  
In Part II, this article addresses core conceptual differences between the 
principles of common law, contract and the Torrens system. The author 
investigates sources of conceptual variations in different jurisprudential 
perspectives on the nature of property law and identifies judicial 
reasoning that merges these perspectives in the search for coherence. 
The author argues that it is not possible to formulate coherent law in this 
area without resorting to legal fictions. However, the utility of fictions 
is maximised when they are adopted with consciousness of their falsity 
and the fundamental incompatibility of their conceptual bases.  
Parts III and IV assess why mortgages pose particular problems within 
the Torrens system.  Part III analyses different approaches to 
                                                          
3 Clements v Ellis [1934] HCA 18, (1934) 51 CLR 217 at 239 per Dixon J.  
4 P B Temm "Mr Bumble right again" (1967) NZLJ 129 at 129; W Taylor "Scotching 
Frazer v Walker" (1970) 44 Aust LJ 248 at 252-256.  
5 R Sackville "The Torrens System: some thoughts on indefeasibility and priorities" 
(1973) 46 Aust LJ 526 at 531.  
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indefeasibility and mortgage law in New Zealand and Canada and 
addresses New Zealand law reform suggestions. Part IV focuses on the 
"incorporation question" and compares different Australian and New 
Zealand approaches to the interpretation of new forms of mortgage 
contracts according to immediate indefeasibility.   
Part V summarises some of the ramifications of incoherence in the New 
Zealand Torrens system.  
The author proposes that incoherence is most prevalent in immediate 
indefeasibility jurisdictions because there is a greater disjunction 
between Torrens and other rules. 
II A New Ownership: 
Under the New Zealand Torrens system, enforceable rights in real 
property are not rooted in the validity or invalidity of the transferor’s 
title. The nemo dat doctrine is abolished.6 Therefore, the exchange of 
covalent rights and duties in a void mortgage contract is therefore 
uncertain, where some rights in the contract are protected by Torrens 
registration and others are not. Where the contract is void because of 
fraud, for example, a right is not transferred through the contract. The 
Torrens register acknowledges this common law rule through the fraud 
exception.7 However, the Torrens principle of “title by registration” 
creates a new type of set of rights, a new ownership, through the Torrens 
register. This “new ownership” is defined by the registration of the title 
that represents it. Title and ownership rights devolve from the register, 
not the transferor. The materialisation of this title and ownership through 
registration is the main formulaic concept on which the Torrens structure 
is based.8  
Most title registration statutes create ambiguity because they aim to 
encapsulate incompatible propositions. The first is that only valid 
instruments are to be registered. The register therefore acts in a 
                                                          
6 Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376 (HCA) at 385-386 per Barwick CJ. 
7 Land Transfer Act 1952, s 62.  
8 Breskvar v Wall, above n 6, at 385.  
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confirmatory capacity, in consistency with the rules of contract – 
registration only affirms rights and duties conferred according to the 
rules of contract. This proposition is congruent with the main policy goal 
of the Torrens system: certainty.9  
The second proposition is that title devolves from registration, 
regardless of the invalidity of conveying instruments. In implementing 
this proposition, courts have created the concept of “immediate 
indefeasibility”, regarded by some jurisdictions as the logical conclusion 
of the certainty principle in practice. However, in practice, the second 
proposition creates ambiguity: primarily, because it conflicts with the 
first proposition; secondarily, because it is incompatible with other law: 
other statutes, the rules of contract and common law principles of 
ownership.  
As this paper will illustrate, the latter proposition is adopted in NZ and 
Australian law, which, unlike Canadian law,10 does not retain and affirm 
common law and contractual principles to the extent to which they 
remain consistent with the Torrens scheme.  
In Torrens systems, a conflict of legal forms ensues – on one side, the 
rules of contract and common law rights; on the other, Torrens 
legislation and principles. The Torrens system in practice does not 
afford the level of certainty in defining the parameters of rights to real 
property which it aims to effect. Certainty is key to the Torrens aims of 
“cheap and expeditious transfer and secure titles”11. Registration 
statutes purport to operate as an exhaustive code. However, they cannot. 
The ordinary rules of contract are still valid as the basis of the 
transaction; these rules are modified and often excluded by the title 
registration statute. Issues arise where defective instruments become 
registered. 
                                                          
9 P O'Connor "Deferred and Immediate Indefeasibility: Bijural Ambiguity in 
Registered Land Title Systems" (2009) 13 Edin L Rev 194 at 6. 
10 United Trust v Dominion Stores [1977] 2 SCR 915. 
11 S Rowton Simpson “The Torrens System” in Land, Law and Registration 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1978) 68-90 at [5.5.2].  
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This conflict is symptomatic of “bijural ambiguity”.12 The author 
suggests that ambiguity is sourced in two different jurisprudential 
conceptions of property: the Lockean and Hohfeldian perspectives. 
Locke views property rights as “rights that could be generated and 
sustained by individuals through their labour and exchange”: legal forms 
which reflect social facts.13 From Hohfeld's perspective, rights do not 
adhere to property or the owner. A property right is the state's legal 
sanction to perform or not perform certain acts.14 Thus the Torrens 
register provides a guideline as to whether or not rights exist, as the law 
will only recognise, as a right, that which is on the register. 
Theoretically, Hohfeld’s conception of rights is consistent with the 
Torrens system: both approaches do not regard rights as legal forms 
dependent on economic or social facts, but only as legal forms, because 
they are on the register. 
The use of a "paramountcy provision" in immediate indefeasibility 
jurisdictions imposes one legal form, the "title by registration", on top 
of the matrix of covalent rights and duties (other legal forms) composing 
the contract. The author labels the Torrens title as a "xenomorphic" legal 
form, as it derives from a conceptual basis which is alien to the ordinary 
rules of contract.  
Forms and fictions:  
This article contests that the assumptions which result from the 
imposition of one "xenomorphic" legal form on other legal forms are 
similar to legal fictions, in that they involve the reconciliation of a 
desired legal result with some expressed or assumed premise. The 
creation of fictions is inevitable in seeking to meld two disparate and 
conceptually incompatible areas of law. When dealing with 
fundamentally incompatible premises, it is impossible to merge the 
premises, or to develop logical reasoning based on both of them in 
                                                          
12 O’Connor, above n 9, at 6.  
13 J Waldron “To Bestow Stability upon Possession” in J Penner and H Smith (eds) 
Philosophical Foundations of Property Law (OUP, Oxford, 2003) at 1-3.  
14 J M Balkin The Hohfeldian approach to Law and Semiotics (1989) 44 UMLR 1119 
at 1122. 
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conjunction. A consciousness of the fictitious nature of such lawmaking 
is required in order to maximise its utility.15 
Two legal fictions arise in the judicial reasoning regarding the 
immediate indefeasibility of mortgages: 
1) The majority’s assumption in Boyd v Mayor of Wellington (Boyd)  that 
the principle of "title by registration" entails that void transactions are 
no longer void once registered;16 
2) The assumption in Frazer v Walker (Frazer) that immediate 
indefeasibility applies to mortgages as well as fee simple and freehold 
title.17  
According to Fuller, a legal fiction arises where a step in the process of 
legal adaptation has taken place in an “ungraceful and inelegant 
manner…where Category A was rather roughly and violently stretched 
to cover the new situation”:18  
A fiction is…a false statement recognised as having utility…a 
fiction taken seriously, that is 'believed' becomes dangerous 
and loses its utility…a fiction becomes wholly safe only when 
it is used with complete awareness of its falsity.  
The purpose of the legal fiction usually consists in making lighter the 
difficulties which are connected with the assimilation and elaboration of 
new, more or less revolutionary, legal principles.19 The author of a 
fiction may be "aware of its inadequacy".20To Fuller, subjectivity and 
the judicial attitude when creating a potential fiction are key. Fuller 
states that fictions are like scaffolding - as the law develops, they can be 
abandoned.21Fictions are often judicial “glosses” which adapt a legal 
rule in a consciously fallacious way to fit an unforeseen situation. 
                                                          
15 L Fuller "Legal Fictions" (1930) 15 Ill Law Rev 363 at 368.  
16 Boyd v Mayor of Wellington [1924] NZLR 1174 (CA).  
17 Frazer v Walker [1967] 1 AC 569 (PC) at 1079. 
18 Fuller, above n 15, at 525.  
19 R von Jhering Geist des Romischen Rechts (Breitkpof und Hertel, Leipzig, 1866) at 
306.  
20 Fuller, above n 15, at 368.  
21 L Fuller Legal Fictions (Stanford University Press, Redwood City, 1967) at 70.   
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However, it is possible for much of an area of law to be fictitiously based 
– as in tax law, fictions in property law arise from a disjunction between 
socioeconomic reality and the legal forms used to express that reality.22 
The author suggests that Torrens “title by registration” introduces a new 
kind of ownership entirely – a "xenomorphic" form of ownership. The 
Torrens idea of title is not ownership itself (a bundle of rights and 
powers) but a legal form which signifies ownership. As this article 
shows, new types of mortgage are particularly expository of 
incompatibility between the principles of transfer of rights by contract, 
and the generation of rights by registration.  
In addition to forming legal fictions, the application of immediate 
indefeasibility in New Zealand in fraud cases such as Westpac v Clark 
(Westpac) involves the creation of more literal fictions, as it "tells 
stories" of a factually non-existent relationship between a registered 
proprietor and a registered transferee/mortgagee.23  
Immediate Indefeasibility:  
The Privy Council in Gibbs v Messer (Gibbs) initially adopted deferred 
indefeasibility.24 The author notes that in the colonial period, the time in 
which the Torrens principles of certainty and title by registration were 
conceived and viewed as most necessary, deferred indefeasibility was 
viewed as consistent with these principles. "The object is to save persons 
dealing with registered proprietors from the trouble and expense of 
going behind the register, in order to investigate the history of their 
author's title, and to satisfy themselves of its validity".25 This end is 
achieved through the protection of bona fide purchasers.  
 In Gibbs, a fraudster forged an instrument of transfer and a mortgage 
document, registering a fictitious person as transferee and mortgagor. 
The Court held that as both the transfer and the mortgage were void 
                                                          
22  See in general J Prebble “Income Taxation: A Structure Built on Sand” (2002) 24 
Sydney L Rev 301, at 305-306.  
23 Westpac New Zealand Ltd v Clark [2009] NZSC 73, [2010] 1 NZLR 82. 
24 Gibbs v Messer [1891] AC 248 (PC). 
25 At 254. 
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according to the rules of contract, the registrar should cancel and reissue 
the titles.26 The judgment identifies the form-based nature of the 
mechanism by which a void contract may be validated: "Cresswell must 
be held to have been de jure, if not de facto, the proprietor, whose name 
was on the register, and that their mortgage…is therefore as valid as if 
Cresswell's own name had been on the register".27 In Westpac, following 
Frazer, the legal form of the relationship and transfer between registered 
proprietor and mortgagee, provided by registration, was paramount over 
the fact and legal substance of the relationship and transfer, which were 
a nullity.28   
Australian and New Zealand courts have subsequently rejected the 
Gibbs approach, restricting its application to cases where forgery has 
involved a fictitious person.29 In Boyd, the Court considered a registered 
transfer which had not been performed correctly according to the Public 
Works Act. The Court would not order the rectification of the register. 
Therefore, the positive system prevailed over the ordinary rules of 
contract and other statutes. The judgment of Barwick CJ in Breskvar v 
Wall indicates a purposive approach:30 
That which the certificate of title describes is not the title 
which the registered proprietor formerly had, or which but for 
registration would have had. The title it certifies is not 
historical or derivative. It is the title which registration itself 
has vested in the proprietor. Consequently, a registration 
which results from a void instrument is effective according to 
the terms of the registration.  
This is both a statement and an expansion of the “title by registration” 
mechanism. The Court utilizes the idea that a transferee’s title devolves 
                                                          
26 The facts of Gibbs accentuate the immediate indefeasibility doctrine's inconsistency 
with the ordinary rules of contractual validity, which entail that no title passes when 
there is no consideration or agreement between the current and former registered 
parties: "Hugh Cameron was…a myth. His was the only name on the register, and 
having no existence, he could neither execute a transfer nor a mortgage" at 254. 
27 At 255. 
28 Above n 23 at [13].  
29 Breskvar v Wall, above n 6; Boyd, above n 16.  
30 Breskvar v Wall, above n 6, at 385-386.  
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from registration, and not from the title of the transferor, as a premise 
for the decision that a prima facie invalid transfer is validated by 
registration.  
“Title by registration” has been adopted in Australia as the basis for the 
primacy of Torrens principles (as manifested in judicial extension of the 
statutory provisions) when in conflict with other law – for example, the 
registration of a mortgage that was void because of incapacity (the 
mortgagor was a minor),31 and transfers void for breaches of other 
statutes.32 However, New Zealand courts have been less ready to apply 
the “title by registration” mechanism with such latitude. In Duncan v 
Macdonald (Duncan), Torrens legislation is read subject to the Illegal 
Contracts Act: section 6 states that the mortgage's power of sale is 
effective to convey legal title by way of security but that the power of 
sale is ineffective until the mortgagee applies to the court under s 7. 33 
Section 7 enables the court to vary and validate the covenant to pay, 
setting the amount payable for release of the charge or out of the 
proceeds of realisation in the same manner as could be done equitably. 
The court's discretion effectively rearranges the register as it negates the 
power of sale.  
It is arguable that the way in which this statute interacts with Torrens 
provisions is contrary to the principled Torrens approach – that the 
register is the only source of title and one only has to look at the register 
to ascertain title. 
The issue of inconsistency between "title by registration" and the Illegal 
Contracts Act reflects the incompatibility of "title by registration" and 
contractual and common law principles of transfer, as the Act is 
premised on these principles.  
 
 
                                                          
31 Horvath v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1999) 1 VR 643 (VSCA) at 158. 
32 Breskvar v Wall, above n 6. 
33 Duncan v McDonald [1997] 3 NZLR 669 (CA). 
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In personam jurisdiction:  
Australian and New Zealand courts permit the granting of in personam 
relief, sourced in the equitable jurisdiction. In personam relief relates to 
the conduct of parties after or during acquisition of registered title. The 
ultimate practical effect of the in personam exception is to undermine 
static security. Due to growing judicial concern about the inconsistency 
between the granting of personal equities and the terms and policy of the 
Torrens acts,34 courts in the 1990s limited the in personam jurisdiction 
to cases where there was something unconscionable in the conduct of 
the registered owner, and there was a recognised cause of action.35 The 
restriction aimed to maintain dynamic security and aligned the in 
personam system with the positive nature of the Torrens system. 
Nevertheless, immediate indefeasibility still presents a bifurcated 
jurisdiction of two extremes: on one hand, the "title by registration" 
polar question of the Torrens system, and on the other, the equitable 
concerns of the in personam jurisdiction. The first is premised on 
certainty and is an external constructor that takes no account of the 
substance of the relationships between parties; the second depends much 
on the courts' discretion and focuses solely on parties' relationships with, 
and conduct to, each other.  
Transactional Flaws and Derivative Title: 
In Boyd, Salmond J dissented in support of deferred indefeasibility and 
the Gibbs approach. Salmond J stated that one of the main purposes of 
the Torrens system was to protect titles of transferees registered in good 
faith, notwithstanding defects in the transferor’s title. This is the 
abolishment of the nemo dat rule – the idea that one’s title derives from 
one’s transferor’s title: “all such prior interests are, in the absence of 
fraud or other specific exceptions, finally and conclusively destroyed by 
                                                          
34 Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604 (HCA) at 613, 638 and 653; Vassos v 
State Bank of South Australia (1993) 2 VR 316 (CA) at 329; Hillpalm Pty Ltd v 
Heaven's Door Pty Ltd (2004) 220 CLR 472 (HCA) at [54].  
35 Grgic v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1994) 33 NSWLR 202 
(NSWSC) at 217-218; Duncan v McDonald, above n 33, at 683-684 per Blanchard J.  
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the bringing of the land under the Act and the issue of an adverse title to 
some other person”.36 
Salmond J viewed the dismissal of the “derivative” concept of title as a 
different issue to the validity of transactions inter partes:37 
The whole law as to the validity and invalidity of conveyances 
and their transactions inter partes would be set aside and 
rendered inoperative so soon as either party succeeded 
honestly, however negligently, in inducing the Registrar to 
register the transaction. I find nothing in either the Act or in 
the public policy which underlies it sufficient to justify so 
remarkable an extension of the doctrine of indefeasibility of 
title. 
The Torrens principles act to protect purchasers against flaws in the 
source of their title, not defects in the transaction. Deferred 
indefeasibility is consistent with the abolishment of nemo dat, and with 
the current New Zealand legislation, which protects an innocent 
purchaser/mortgagee from challenges "on the ground that his vendor or 
mortgagor may have been registered as proprietor through fraud or error, 
or under any void or voidable instrument, or may have derived from or 
through a person registered as proprietor through fraud or error, or under 
any void or voidable instrument."38 This section does not necessarily 
protect title from challenges based on the invalidity of the instrument of 
transfer. The second “may” phrase appears to apply to the transferor’s 
author, not the transferee’s. 
III The Mortgage Problem: 
“Title by registration” is difficult to apply to mortgages, which, as 
charges, interact with pre-existing fee simple or freehold title. The 
mortgage, by its registration, does not eliminate the previous title, even 
                                                          
36 Boyd, above n 16, at 1204 per Salmond J. 
37 Boyd, above n 16, at 1203 per Salmond J. 
38 Land Transfer Act 1952, s 183.  
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though it confers the ability to do so (the power of sale) on the 
mortgagee.  
The immediate indefeasibility of the mortgage did not arise because of 
conscious policy decisions, but because the Frazer decision did not 
differentiate between fee simple, and the mortgage in determining the 
effect of the paramountcy provision in the Torrens statute.  
The narrow ambit of the fraud and in personam exceptions entails that 
mortgagees have little incentive to guard against fraud, where 
mortgagees, as institutional lenders, are well placed to take precautions 
by verifying the identity of lendees.39 Furthermore, the Act compensates 
institutional lenders indirectly by remunerating the erstwhile registered 
proprietor while the mortgagee enjoys its power of sale.40  
NZ Reforms: 
From an economic perspective, the cost of fraud can be minimized if the 
law imposes the liability on the party who can avoid the occurrence of 
fraud at least cost.41  
Following similar statutory amendments in Queensland and NSW,42 
New Zealand law reform recommendations seek to place an onus on 
mortgagees to "take reasonable steps" to verify mortgagors' titles, 
incentivising lenders to avoid fraud.43 A mortgagee's title will be 
defeasible if the mortgagee fails to take reasonable steps to check the 
identity of the mortgagor. 
Similarly, reform suggestions modify the current system of immediate 
indefeasibility by "introducing judicial discretion as a means of avoiding 
manifest injustice in limited cases".44 This suggestion is intended as an 
extension of the in personam jurisdiction and an incorporation of it 
                                                          
39 Grgic, above n 35; Assets Co Ltd v Mere Roihi [1905] AC 176 (PC). 
40 Land Transfer Act 1952, ss 172 and 172A.  
41 O'Connor, above n 9, at 207.  
42 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), ss 185(1A), 11A and 11B; Real Property and 
Conveyancing Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (NSW), s 56C. 
43 New Zealand Law Commission A New Land Transfer Act (NZLC R116, 2010) at 
[2.19].  
44At [2.16].  
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within the Torrens scheme, 45  while being conceptually inconsistent 
with that scheme: "the interests of justice substantially outweigh 
transactional certainty in the few cases where discretion would need to 
be exercised".46 
Canadian Approaches: 
In Canada, Torrens statutes require clear and unambiguous language to 
displace common law principles.47Canadian courts read Torrens statutes 
in a manner which gives equal weight to Torrens principles and the 
common law.  
Ontario: 
Most Canadian provinces have adopted deferred 
indefeasibility.48However, in some provinces, there is ambiguity 
regarding its scope.  
The interaction of the deferred and immediate indefeasibility rules in 
Ontario is very different to New Zealand. Household Realty Corp v Liu 
(Liu), involving similar facts to Frazer, considered a conflict between 
two statutory rules: the positive system of title by registration and the 
rule of deferred indefeasibility.49 The statute's statement of deferred 
indefeasibility is consistent with Salmond J's Boyd distinction between 
invalidity by authorial title and invalidity by instrument – s 155 states 
that a fraudulent "disposition" (act of transfer) is invalid. The Court in 
Liu, similarly to Frazer, held that s 78(4) (the "title by registration" 
section) was "paramount" over s 155. The determination differed from 
Frazer in two ways. The Court interpreted s 78(4) as "paramount", not 
on the basis of Torrens principles, but as a matter of statutory 
interpretation. The Act stated that s 155 was "subject to [the rest of] the 
Act". Also, the conflicting sections were not, as in Frazer, the "title by 
                                                          
45At [2.14].  
46At [2.16]. 
47 Dominion Stores Ltd, above n 10.  
48 Joint Land Titles Committee Renovating the Foundation: Proposals for Model 
Land Recording and Registration Act for the Provinces and Territories of Canada 
(ALRI, 1990).  
49 Land Title Act RSO 1990 c L-5, ss 78 (4) and 155. 
 
 
16 
 
registration section" and the "register amendment" section,50 but the 
"title by registration" section and a "deferred indefeasibility" section.  
In contrast with public responses to NZ law reforms,51 the Ontarian 
public, perhaps spurred on by concerns about mortgage fraud in the 
United States, viewed Liu as introducing "a serious mortgage fraud 
plague".52 Section 78(4) was amended, so that "title by registration" 
does not apply to registration of fraudulent instruments.53 Lawrence v 
Maple Trust Company later overturned Liu, stating that the Act 
accommodated interpretations consistent with both deferred and 
immediate indefeasibility. However, common law principles only 
supported deferred indefeasibility.54Thus, common law principles 
informed the interpretation of the Torrens statute and clear statutory 
language would be needed to cancel the application of those principles.  
British Columbia: 
In 2006, British Columbia amended its Torrens statute to provide 
immediate indefeasibility for fee simple titleholders.55Before this 
change, courts relied on Gibbs to interpret conflicting sections according 
to deferred indefeasibility; ignoring the law change in Frazer.  
In British Columbia, indefeasibility does not apply to mortgages. 
However, questions similar to the deferred/immediate indefeasibility 
problem arise in respect of registered fraudulent mortgages. In Gill v 
Bucholtz,56 a fraudster, forged a transfer of the land to an accessory, who 
mortgaged the property to two innocent parties. The Court reasserted the 
                                                          
50 Land Transfer Act 1952, ss 62, 80 and 81.  
51 See in general New Zealand Law Commission, above n 43, at 11-12. 
52 Rabi v. Rosu (2006) 277 DLR (4d) 544 (ONSC) at [2]; See in general: B Aaron 
“Mortgage fraud persists with cash-back schemes” Toronto Star (Toronto, 10 
December 2006); A Coombes “Borrowers discover that home is where the mortgage 
fraud is” Wall Street Journal (New York, 11 April 2006); J Creswell, “Web help for 
getting mortgage the criminal way” New York Times (New York, 16 June 2007). 
53 Section 78 (4.1). 
54 Lawrence v Maple Trust Company (2007) 278 DLR (4d) 698 (ONCA) at [54].  
55 Land Title Act RSBC 1996 c 250, s 25.1. 
56 Gill v Bucholtz [2008] BCSC 758.  
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nemo dat principle for mere charges as these are lesser interests than the 
fee simple, and are dependent on the title of the registered proprietor.57 
The British Columbian and Ontarian perspectives exemplify the general 
Canadian view that, as a mortgage is dependent on the title of the 
mortgagor, indefeasibility principles must work differently. By asserting 
common law rules, Canada can therefore avoid most of the 
incorporation and contractual interpretation issues which vex immediate 
indefeasibility.  
IV The Incorporation Question  
Modern forms of mortgages are very different from those of the Gibbs 
era. Lenders use collections of documents to formalise secured loans. 
Among these are a simple instrument of mortgage which includes the 
provisions of a registered memorandum,58 and the “all-obligations 
mortgage”, which identifies the mortgaged property and records that the 
mortgage secures all money which the mortgagor may owe to the 
mortgagee now, or in the future, for any reason. In the latter case, the 
terms of any loans appear in separate loan agreements, which are not 
registered. The all-obligations conundrum is a symptom of dissonance 
between the circumstances in which the Torrens principles were 
encapsulated, and innovations in contract formation which are adapted 
to complex lending systems. 
Australian and New Zealand law states that the performance of a 
personal obligation must be “an integral part of the estate or interest of 
the registered proprietor” to be protected by registration.59  
The principles of “certainty” and “autonomy” are central to the Torrens 
system and contract law respectively.60 Courts seek to resolve conflict 
                                                          
57 At [26].  
58 Land Transfer Act 1952, s 155A. 
59 Congregational Christian Church of Samoa Henderson Trust Board v Broadlands 
Finance Ltd [1984] NZLR 704 (HC) at 713-714; Travinto Nominees Pty Ltd v Vlattas 
(1973) 129 CLR 1 (HCA) at 17; Mercantile Credits Ltd v The Shell Company of 
Australia Ltd (1976) 136 CLR 326 (HCA) at 343 per Gibbs J.  
60M Harding "Property, Contract, and the Forged Registered Mortgage" (2010) 24(1) 
NZULR 21 at 23.  
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between these principles. In Queensland, registration confirms the 
promise to repay, as contingent on the title. The register protects the 
mortgagee’s right to sue the mortgagor personally for the debt. A 
registered mortgage’s indefeasibility extends to the covenant to repay 
the sum secured by the mortgage.61This approach aims to maintain 
consistency with the core Torrens principle and concept: the principle of 
certainty and the concept of "title by registration", not from the 
combined legal form and substance, or exegesis, of the contract.  
As Harding explains, the primacy of the register rejects the autonomy of 
contract law in two ways – in the case above, it gives the whole contract 
an elevated and protected status which may not be intended or expected 
by the contracting parties, and in the case of forged mortgages (such as 
Westpac), it binds the mortgagor to agreements which he/she did not 
intend to enter into.62  This conundrum is sourced in the nature of the 
mortgage. 
In economic substance, a mortgage is more than a mere "interest". It is 
the right to sell. This is part of the right to derive income, which is 
labeled by some scholars as the core of ownership.63 Therefore, a 
mortgage is a kind of semi-ownership.  
A mortgage also depends on pre-existing fee simple title. It is 
conceptually strained to state that the existence of the mortgage depends 
on its registration, and does not originate from the author's title, 
according to the abolishment of nemo dat. This is because, by its nature, 
it does devolve from a mortgagor's title.  
The mortgage document not only places a charge on title. It secures 
personal obligations also. Registration may or may not extend to these 
obligations. According to the laws of contract, these personal 
obligations are established by the "meeting of the minds" – the substance 
                                                          
61 Hilton v Gray [2007] QSC 401, (2008) Q Conv R 54,686 at [48]-[55]; Parker v 
Mortgage Advance Securities Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 275 at [6]. 
62 Harding, above n 60, at 26.  
63 K Holmes The Concept of Income: a Multi-Disciplinary Analysis (IBFD, 
Amsterdam, 2001) at 328. 
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of the relationship between the parties, illustrated by a structure of legal 
forms via the contract. Registration then purports to fully "animate" this 
contract through the xenomorphic legal form of "title/interest by 
registration", even though there is no substantive relationship between 
the parties involved. Hence the title of this paper: the "Frankenstein 
Mortgage". 
Recent Approaches: 
Property/contract compromise has given rise to inconsistency in courts’ 
treatment of different types of mortgages. Some jurisdictions have 
adopted an “incorporation approach”, which splits the mortgage contract 
into two categories: material pertinent to registration – usually the 
charge on land and power of sale; and ancillary materials, such as an all-
obligations loan.64Registration does not secure ancillary loans, therefore 
the mortgage in economic substance secured nothing, even though in 
legal form it is an indefeasible charge.  
In Westpac, a fraudster obtained an unregistered mortgage from 
Westpac, an innocent party, in the name of F, the registered proprietor. 
The document purported to secure a promise to repay “all money 
which…you may owe…now or in the future for any reason”. It was 
unsure whether or not F would have owed Westpac any money under 
this contract, were it registered. The Court read the matrix of rights 
under this contract strictly. The contract addressed “you” –F, the named 
person on the document, not the fraudster who had actually signed. 
Westpac had not lent F anything. Therefore, registration would have 
animated the contract, but this clause of the contract was ineffectual ex 
ante against F. The Court held that terms of an unregistered loan contract 
can be protected by registration of the mortgage instrument “only if the 
mortgage…must be interpreted as so requiring”.65  
                                                          
64 Duncan v McDonald, above 33, at 682; Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v English 
[2010] NSWSC 32, (2009) 14 BPR 26,675 at [125]; Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd 
v Xiao Hui Ying [2015] VSC 21. 
65 At [44].  
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The Court saw “no obvious policy reason” for a strict differentiation 
between charge and loan,66 even where such a delineation would be 
consistent with the principle of certainty. 
The Westpac approach differs from that of Provident Capital Limited v 
Printy, a NSW case which states that registration did not protect the 
whole of an all obligations mortgage, and that, in the Torrens context, 
there was no requirement to read separate parts of a mortgage instrument 
together.67 NSW indirectly disapproved a Westpac-style reliance on the 
terms of individual clauses:68  
It may seem odd that the fate of an innocent owner, entirely 
ignorant of a purported loan and mortgage in his/her name, can 
depend upon the fortuitous circumstance that the mortgagee 
has or has not included, with sufficient specificity in the 
mortgage documents, the debt the subject of the mortgage.  
Under this analysis, the Westpac reliance on contractual terms is less 
desirable than just delineating between all-obligations and conventional 
mortgages, as it is less certain. Provident’s reasoning was based on 
legislation which required identification of a “default” “in the 
observance of any covenant…in the mortgage” or “in the payment, in 
accordance with the terms of the mortgage…of (money) the payment of 
which (was) secured by the mortgage”.69 The Court held that there could 
be no relevant default as the part of the mortgage which was animated 
by registration did not itself contain terms specifying the requirements 
of payment, and also did not contain a term incorporating the deed of 
loan into the mortgage.70 The approach is similar to that of Glazebrook 
J in the Court of Appeal judgment of Westpac, which was majorly based 
on Australian authorities.71  Glazebrook J concluded that the registration 
of a mortgage validates the terms and conditions in the instrument of 
                                                          
66 At [88].  
67 Provident Capital Ltd v Printy [2008] NSWCA 131, (2008) 13 BPR 25,199 at 
[53]. 
68 Perpetual Trustees Victoria v English, above n 62, at [126].  
69 Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), s 57 (2). 
70 At [52]. 
71 Westpac Banking Corporation v Clark [2008] NZCA 346, [2009] 1 NZLR 201. 
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mortgage which delimit or qualify the estate or interest of the mortgagee 
in the land,72 and that terms and conditions of other agreements may be 
incorporated by reference into a registered mortgage of interest, but that 
the personal covenant to pay of a forged or otherwise void mortgage 
cannot be enforced against the registered proprietor personally.73 
Pre-Westpac Approaches: 
Writing prior to Westpac, Scott (unlike Blanchard J) states that there is 
insufficient connection between a registered charge and a secured debt 
for the debt to be protected by registration.74The charge of a forged 
registered mortgage may exist in the absence of the debt, and a registered 
unforged mortgage may not be discharged even though the secured sum 
has actually been repaid.75   
Scott considers the legal and economic substance of the mortgage 
document and what is actually secured. He dismisses, as a fallacy (or 
fiction), the idea that Torrens registration provides complete protection. 
Although he does not illustrate the correlation in terms of a preference 
for reflection of substance and  form in rights conferred by contract, 
rather than the register and its principles, Harding identifies a similarity 
in reasoning between the British Columbian perspective and Scott’s 
viewpoint - where a forged mortgage cannot become indefeasible 
through registration, “the mortgage, if it were a valid 
instrument…would secure nothing, as the mortgagors has received 
nothing thereunder and, hence, would owe nothing to the mortgagee”76. 
In a British Columbian context, according to Scott’s view, the mortgage 
is a nullity both in legal substance and in legal form. Under New Zealand 
law the mortgage is indefeasible in legal form, as originating in the 
                                                          
72 At [30]-[31], [70] and [90]. 
73 At [90]. 
74 Struan Scott “Indefeasibility and the Forged Mortgage” [1998] NZLR 531 at 533.  
75 At 533-534.  
76 Credit Foncier Franco-Canadien v Bennett (1963) 43 WWR 545 (BCCA); 
Homewood Mortgage Investments Ltd v Lee 2008 BCSC 512 at [10].  
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register, but, in legal substance, it only secures the right of sale, not the 
entirety of the charge.  
Duncan reiterates reasoning in NSW cases: registration “validates only 
those provisions that delimit or qualify the registered interest or that are 
otherwise necessary to assure that interest to the registered proprietor”.77 
This statement resonates with an earlier New Zealand case, which draws 
a line between “covenants affecting the estate or interest…or rights 
pertaining to a registered property”, which are “upheld, notwithstanding 
invalidity”, and “rights…which are not an integral part of the estate or 
interest of the registered proprietor”.78 The New Zealand approach, 
however, assumes that the mortgage contract is prima facie invalid, and 
that certain parts of it, which are pertinent to the land, are validated by 
their contingency to the registered title. Their limitation on the title is 
activated because it is pertinent to the title of the mortgagor. Duncan 
states that the “primary transaction” involved in a mortgage is not 
“dealing in property”. It is the loan. The part of the contract which 
affects the registered proprietor’s title, and is animated by that title, is 
the only part of the legal charge and contract which is protected. 
Moreover, the “interest” given to the mortgagee is “for, and only for, a 
particular purpose” – so that the mortgagee may have right of recourse. 
Therefore, there is a twofold limitation on the contract’s validity. 
Primarily, only the part of the contract affecting the land is validated. 
Secondarily, the part of the contract affecting the land is delineated with 
regard to the loan – the other, non-validated part of the void contract. 
So, it is not true that only the part of the mortgage affecting the land is 
validated, where one must look to the rest of the document to ascertain 
live limits on that charge.  
Blanchard J begins his analysis with a statement which defines the 
mortgage in terms of economic fact: the point of the Torrens mortgage 
                                                          
77 Duncan, above n 33, at 681; P Butt Land Law (3rd ed, Law Book Co of Australasia, 
Sydney, 1996) at [2019]; PT Ltd v Maradona Pty Ltd [1992] 24 NSWLR 643 (HCA) 
at 679; Travinto Nominees Pty Ltd, above n 59, at 48.  
78 Congregational Christian Church, above n 59, at 713-714 per Boarker J. 
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is to give the mortgagee the power of sale and a right to the proceeds if 
the mortgagor defaults.79 The secured title only extends to the “right of 
recourse to the security for such value as the land may have”, not to the 
right to the performance of the promise to repay.80Therefore, in the case 
of a void instrument, the promise to repay is void. Part of the mortgage 
contract is valid, part is not.  The mortgagor’s set of rights are those of 
“xenomorphic” legal form only, conjured into existence by the register 
– they do not reflect any actual agreement between the parties. This is 
an “irrebuttable (legal) fiction”.81 Harding views the fiction as 
constructed through statutory interpretation, in a compromise between 
the Torrens concept and the principles of contract law.82 
The property/contract/common law compromise also operates regarding 
leases. Section 118 provides that a registered memorandum of lease may 
include "a right for or covenant by the lessee to purchase the land".83Fels 
v Knowles establishes that the option to purchase is protected by 
registration, where the transfer and instrument is prima facie void as 
being ultra vires - the lessors did not have the power to grant the 
option.84 The Fels decision can be contained within the delineation 
proposition, that only parts of agreements which are "an integral part of 
the estate of interest of the registered proprietor" can be validated by 
registration.85 
According to Duncan, “registration [only] protects the charge”.86 The 
charge, as security for the debt, is indefeasible; but only through and to 
the extent of rights in the land. The rest of the charge, as a personal 
covenant, is not enforceable. Thus the mortgage is split in two. As Scott 
identifies, a mortgage is more than just a charge on land. It is a set of 
                                                          
79 Duncan v McDonald, above n 33, at 682.  
80 At 682-683. 
81 Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v English, above n 65, at [125].  
82 Harding, above n 60, at 31. Harding does not identify the Perpetual Trustees 
dictum with Fuller’s fictions.  
83 Land Transfer Act, s 118. 
84 Fels v Knowles (1906) 26 NZLR 604 (CA); Rotorua and Bay of Plenty Hunt Club 
(Inc) v Baker [1941] NZLR 669 (SC). 
85 Congregational Christian Church, above n 59, at 714.  
86 At 682.  
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covenants and powers. The charge on land relates closely to the personal 
covenant to repay; the purpose of the charge is to secure repayment.87 
In Duncan, the mortgagee can, without court order, simply exercise the 
power of sale, but cannot enforce or obtain judgment on the personal 
obligations in the contract. The mortgage is “a nullity” apart from 
registration. The principle of title by registration takes precedence over 
the principles of contract;88 where the otherwise void instrument 
becomes registered, it is effective so far only as is necessary to uphold 
and protect the title but no further.89These dicta encapsulate the fiction 
that “charge by registration” equals “contract by registration”, insofar as 
the contract confers the charge. The Torrens principle is vexed because 
nature of a mortgage is very different to that of fee simple title. A 
mortgage does not secure title; it provides a charge over the title as 
security, and, of its nature, devolves from the rights of the registered 
proprietor.  
The above compromises cannot fully satisfy the Torrens principle of 
certainty. To do so, registration would have to animate the entire void 
mortgage agreement.  
Scott opines that the logical dissonance of the Duncan approach entails 
that either registration has no effect on the underlying debt, or that 
registration regenerates the debt from the void contract and the 
mortgagor must find recourse through the in personam jurisdiction to 
prevent the mortgagee from enforcing the debt.90 If the first option, 
Scott's preference, is in effect, then in practice the court will not allow 
the mortgagee to sue for the secured sum.91In economic substance, the 
mortgage is a nullity, as the mortgagor has not personal liability to repay, 
and the charge does not secure repayment. Scott prefers the first option.  
                                                          
87 At 533.  
88 Breskvar v Wall, above n 6, at 385.  
89 Duncan, above n 33, at 681.  
90 Scott, above n 74, at 533.  
91 CN and NA Davies Ltd v Laughton [1997] 3 NZLR 705 (CA) per Thomas J. 
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Frazer v Walker and Incorporation:  
Frazer affirmed (in obiter) the immediate nature of indefeasible title 
under s 62 and s 183, following Boyd, and extended the immediate 
indefeasibility doctrine to charges. If the covenant to pay is viewed as 
an integral part of the mortgagee's interest, then it is also validated by 
registration.92 Also, there must be a valid payable debt, on which the 
validated power of sale and covenant to pay can operate. These 
assumptions, of course, are the "complete validation" approach. New 
Zealand law is indecisive regarding this approach. In the first instance 
of Laughton, Blanchard J, citing Frazer, stated that registration of a 
mortgage removes mortgagor defences for not repaying a loan "directly 
advanced" to the mortgagor under the mortgage.93 Blanchard J's 
proposition is difficult to apply to a Westpac type situation where the 
loan was not advanced to the owner. The facts of Frazer are perhaps 
unfortunate in that they produce an ambiguous precedent – in Frazer the 
fraudster (Mrs Frazer) was also a registered proprietor.  
Blanchard J dissected the mortgage according to "primary obligations" 
(where the sum is "directly advanced" to the registered proprietor) and 
"secondary obligations":94  
Where the mortgagor's obligation to pay is in truth a collateral 
obligation of guarantee…ordinary principles of the law 
relating to guarantees apply regardless of registration of the 
security for the guarantor's obligation. The security created by 
the mortgage remains, for it is indefeasible, but it is 
arguable…that no underlying obligation remains in respect of 
which the security can operate.  
Therefore, where the sum is not "directly advanced", despite the power 
of sale, the mortgage in its capacity as security, not just charge, is not 
                                                          
92 As is the NSW perspective, illustrated in PT Ltd v Maradona Pty, above n 77, at 
677-681. 
93Laughton v CN & NA Davies Ltd & Anor (1996) 3 NZ ConvC 192,356 (HC) at 
192,361; Land Transfer Act 1952 ss 62 and 63; See in general S Scott "Extension to a 
Mortgagor's Covenant to Pay and Power of Sale – Guarantees" (1996) 7 BCB 188.  
94 At 192,361-192,362. 
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indefeasible – in economic substance it secures nothing, and Torrens 
indefeasibility is subject to a separate set of legal principles relating to 
guarantees. The Court instead approached the case on an in personam 
basis.95The effect of the in personam claim was as if the mortgagor 
discharged the debt or the mortgagee forgave the debt.  
Underlying this conclusion, there is an assumption that registration 
validates unenforceable covenants to pay, and that covenants to pay are 
not severable from the power of sale – in fact, a covenant to pay gives 
rise to the power of sale to recover the debt.96 The complete validation 
assumption "overlooks the distinction between the conferral of a power 
of sale and the exercise of that power".97  
Solak v Bank of Western Australia Ltd (Solak)98 
In a judgment which has now been overruled in accordance with the 
NSW approach,99 Victoria approached a contract very similar to that 
addressed in Westpac on the basis that the right to repayment is covered 
and protected by registration. References, as in Westpac, to “you” in the 
all obligations mortgage, were found to apply to the registered 
proprietor, not to the fraudster who signed the document.100  
The Court initially reasoned that the “loan contract is intended to…be 
incorporated into the mortgage”,101 and then came to a conclusion 
regarding the “you” of the contract that was the reverse of Westpac. The 
reasoning in Solak is based on an assumption that the parties intended 
for the terms of the loan contract to be incorporated into the mortgage 
instrument. The author argues that this is not necessarily so – in the case 
of a forged mortgage, the parties bound by registration have no mutual 
intentions whatsoever. There is no reason to believe that the Court in 
Solak is prioritising contractual terms, legal forms which evidence the 
                                                          
95 CN and NA Davies Ltd v Laughton, above n 91. 
96 Scott, above n 73, at 540.  
97 At 540. 
98 Solak v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2009] VSC 82. 
99 Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v Xiao Hui Ying, above n 64.  
100At [15]. 
101At [13].  
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substance of the meeting of the minds, over the principle of certainty 
and clear delineation of what is protected under the Register and what is 
not:102 
It is inherent in any forgery that the victim of the forgery has 
not assumed contractual obligations upon which he or she can 
be sued personally. It is therefore, not an answer to the 
consequences of indefeasibility that there may be no personal 
obligations assumed by the true owner of the land where the 
covenant to pay is identified by the mortgage. 
Thus the right to the performance of the promise to repay, if expressed 
in a mortgage instrument, falls within the mortgagee’s title upon 
registration. The Court distinguished Printy on the grounds that in that 
case the collateral agreements were not incorporated within the 
mortgage document.103 Solak takes the view that the propositions in 
Printy do not provide a basis for reading down terms in the incorporated 
and registered mortgage document in view of statutory protections; 
according to Solak, it is immaterial that mortgages as securities can exist 
without covenants to pay, or that covenants to pay may be collateral to 
a debt in a separate loan agreement.104 The court seems to be stating that 
the covenant is valid (immediately indefeasible) just because it is part of 
the registered mortgage document, not because of the nature of its 
subject matter. 
Westpac does not accord with Solak, and did not mention the case, 
despite the factual similarity. Westpac and Ying, more so than Solak, 
focus on the rules of contract and seem ready to restrict the validation of 
a mortgage as much as is possible, whilst retaining the immediate 
indefeasibility doctrine: “the court will certainly not strain to find that a 
reference in a registered document is apt to encompass an unregistered 
                                                          
102At [16]. 
103 Provident Capital v Printy, above n 67.  
104 At [17].  
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forged instrument… (where) no obligation was ever accepted by the 
registered proprietor”.105  
Queensland: 
Queensland courts have taken a different view to Westpac. In 
Queensland Premier Mines Pty Ltd v French (French),106 Kiefel J 
distinguished between “rights arising from the instrument which creates 
the interest in land” and “the right to recovery of a debt merely 
collaterally secured by the mortgage” – the subject matter of an 
unregistered collateral loan contract.107 This case dealt with legislation 
which states that the transferee of a registered mortgage acquires the 
right to “recover a debt or enforce a liability under the mortgage”.108 
Notwithstanding the latitude of this phrasing, Keifel J held that the 
payment of collaterally secured debt is not covered by registration, as “it 
is no part of the purpose and function of a statute such as the Land Title 
Act to rewrite the bargain between transferor and 
transferee”.109Therefore, the transferee did not acquire rights to the 
payment of the debt by registration of the transfer. This reasoning 
centers on the primacy of contract, the variety of tangential loan 
agreements in practice, and a reluctance to rescribe contractual 
agreements.  
Kirby J identifies aspects of Torrens principles which correlate with 
current public policy objectives:110  
There is to be a register open to the public which will 
record…the nature of a specified interest which, in this case, 
is the mortgage. An inspection of the register should revel all 
about the title. What parties did or thought “on the side” 
should not be relevant. Fulfilling that public purpose suggests 
that, without very clear statutory language, courts should resist 
                                                          
105 Westpac, above n 23, at [51] per Blanchard J.  
106 Queensland Premier Mines Pty Ltd v French (2007) 235 CLR 81 (HCA).  
107 At [55].  
108 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), s 62. 
109 At [56].  
110 Queensland Premier Mines Pty Ltd v French, above n 106, at [15].  
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importing into the Act consequences that are interstitial or 
implied from the description of the rights that are subject to 
registration. Because the personal obligations that derive from 
the loan agreement are legally separate and distinct from the 
obligations arising, as such, “under the mortgage”, they are 
not automatically transferred with the mortgage that is 
registerable. Unless included in the mortgage instrument 
itself, to be transferred they require separate and specific 
agreement by those who are parties to the loan agreement.  
French did not concern a forged document. The document was a valid 
collateral loan contract which was unassigned to the new mortgagee 
when a Torrens mortgage was transferred to, and registered by, a new 
mortgagee. Westpac differs from French - the former focuses on the 
“you” terminology in the contract being inapplicable to the registered 
proprietor, because it addressed the fraudster. Blanchard J remarked that 
“a different conclusion might have been reached” if the registered 
proprietor were “expressly made liable...but that would have to have 
been done very explicitly”.111 However, these statements are qualified 
by the context of fraud; they refer to the liability of the registered 
proprietor as opposed to the fraudster, not the extension of protection 
afforded by registration to collateral loans:112 
A court will certainly not strain to find that a reference in a 
registered document is apt to encompass an unregistered 
forged document, and so provide the mortgagee with a 
security for a covenant to pay moneys for which no obligation 
was ever accepted by the registered proprietor. 
French assumes that, as expressed in contract, and affirmed by the 
primacy of contract, parties intend against incorporation, and that 
mortgage instruments should be read narrowly. Harding interprets both 
French and Westpac as showing “a clear preference for mortgagor 
autonomy over mortgagee certainty when answering the incorporation 
                                                          
111 Westpac, above n 23, at [51].  
112 At [51].  
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question”.113 However, Westpac does not address incorporation as 
directly as French. Westpac is about a forged unregistered document. 
The factual background affects constructions of contractual 
interpretation and intention. The New Zealand position on incorporation 
is therefore less clear.   
Harding interprets the approach of Westpac as a “preference of contract 
over property” only regarding incorporation. Harding views 
incorporation as a “distinctly contractual question” and that it is 
inappropriate to apply Torrens principles to the process of contractual 
interpretation and therefore “intrude into the core of the law of 
contract”.114Following Harding's assessment, the author comments that 
Westpac may indicate a slight discomfort with the Frazer approach, 
which (in obiter) regarded s 183 as extending "to the case of a mortgagee 
who is the "proprietor" of the mortgage and who has the power of sale 
over the fee simple".115 Elias CJ comments that although 
“noncompliance with the requirements of registration does not affect the 
validity of registration …the policy which attaches on registration does 
not relate back to overcome the need for compliance with the statutory 
provision”.116 This statement identifies the logical dissonance between 
the propositions which the author identifies on page 3.  
Conclusion:  
Incorporation issues originate primarily in a lack of guidelines in the 
Torrens statutes regarding which aspects of a mortgage are immediately 
defeasible and which parts of a faulty registered instrument can be 
corrected, and secondarily in  an discrepancy between modern forms of 
mortgages and the principles on which the Torrens system were based. 
The protection of the charge through registration may be a “Phyrric 
victory” for the mortgagee as the main substance of the charge may be 
                                                          
113 Harding, above n 59, at 39.  
114 Harding, above n 59, at 40.  
115 Frazer v Walker, above n 17, at 1079; See Westpac, above n 21, at [13] per Elias 
CJ.    
116 At [13]. 
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unenforceable.117 Contract law states that there is no debt, and therefore 
no basis for recourse to the land, even if the money advanced is not 
repaid.  
V Conclusion:  
The Torrens system requires jurisdictions to engage in a perpetual search 
for coherence. An awareness of the ideological disunion underlying the 
law of real property enables judges to utilise legal fictions to subduct 
concepts in a congruent manner and achieve a semblance of a unified 
legal form. As O'Connor comments, incoherence is most prevalent in 
immediate indefeasibility jurisdictions because there is a greater 
disjunction between positive and ordinary rules.118 Furthermore, the 
operation of the in personam jurisdiction produces a polarity of form-
based positive law on one hand and relational substance-based equity on 
the other. 
Recent New Zealand reform ideas are a "coalface" attempt to ameliorate 
the practical consequences of immediate indefeasibility. However, they 
do not rectify the incomprehensibility of registration's operation, which 
results from basic conceptual incompatibilities. Proposed reforms do not 
address the incorporation question. The author suggests that, rather than 
etiolating the Torrens principle of certainty through policy-based 
rationales – effectively reconstructing the immediate indefeasibility 
doctrine – reforms require an examination of residuary common law 
principles and conceptual sources of law, combined with a 
consciousness of the fictitious and illogical nature of lawmaking that 
must, to maximize practical efficacy, provide a compromise between the 
two systems.  
 
                                                          
117 Harding, above n 59, at 22.  
118 O'Connor, above n 9, at 31.  
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